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ON MAXIMIZING DETERRENCE PER DOLLAR
Andy Spalding*
INTRODUCTION
Professor Peter Reilly addresses concerns1 that practitioners in this
space have privately and publicly debated for years. What exactly is
cooperation credit? Can we quantify it? The government promises that
self-reporting is in our self-interest, but the government’s interest in
saying so is obvious enough. What evidence can the government
provide? Having participated in these conversations myself, I can attest
to the prevalence of outside counsel advising companies to self-report,
all the while aware of their recommendation’s uncertain basis.
Companies often accept the advice begrudgingly, and understandably
so.
The difficulty of measuring this credit is somewhat ironic, given the
government’s dependence on cooperation. As this essay will show, our
modern enforcement regime, which has four components—the internal
or independent investigation, voluntary disclosure, cooperation credit,
and a negotiated settlement2—is the government’s method of
maximizing general deterrence with finite resources. Ensuring that
defendant companies see sufficient incentive to self-report is therefore
critical to advancing the policy goals that inhere in anti-bribery
enforcement.
Hence the value of Professor Reilly’s critique. He argues that the
government “must provide greater transparency regarding specific and
calculable benefits that can be achieved through self-reporting and
cooperation”3 in FCPA settlements. And indeed, it may be powerful
evidence of his argument’s force that very recently, the government has
taken measures to do that very thing. Put another way, Professor
Reilly’s is an idea whose time has come.
This Essay provides both background and foreground to Professor
Reilly’s article. It first explains the role of self-reporting and
cooperation in anti-bribery enforcement, suggesting that the government
is essentially seeking to adjust both the numerator and denominator of a
ratio that might be called Deterrence Per Dollar. This Essay will then
describe and endorse Professor Reilly’s critique of FCPA enforcement,
* Associate Professor of Law, the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery
Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure Under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683, 1683 (2015).
2. Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on Brazil’s Third Pillar: The Clean Companies Act,
THE FCPA BLOG (July 25, 2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/25/andy-spalding-onbrazils-third-pillar-the-clean-companies-ac.html.
3. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1683.
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and show how the government seems to have recently responded to that
critique with a flurry of important reforms. Finally, I briefly discuss the
prospects of adopting additional reforms, and conclude by sounding a
hopeful note that these would likewise command Professor Reilly’s
support.
I.

WHY SELF-REPORTING?

The government’s incentive for recommending self-reporting may
be underappreciated. The more superficial explanation holds that the
government is trying to get someone else to do its work: Rather than
conducting its own investigation, it can just pressure the defendant to do
so. This way of thinking is true as far as it goes, but the real reason runs
deeper.
An enforcement agency of course begins with a limited budget. The
agency’s ultimate aim is general deterrence—preventing would-be
offenders from committing a similar crime. Accordingly, the
government is trying to get maximal deterrence on a constrained budget.
It seeks the greatest deterrence “bang for the buck.” This figure might
be best expressed as a ratio: deterrence per dollar (DPD). An
enforcement agency seeks to maximize this ratio, getting as much
deterrence as possible for the dollars it has available.
Efforts to increase deterrence can then be understood as tinkering
with either half of this ratio. The government may seek to increase the
numerator, while keeping the denominator constant. That is, it might
find ways to improve general deterrence without increasing its budget,
rendering enforcement more efficient. Or, it may on occasion find its
denominator increased, in which case it has an increased budget. With
an increased denominator comes an expectation that the additional
enforcement efforts this money will buy will at least keep the ratio
constant. Each of these—increasing deterrence either with or without
increasing the budget—will happen from time to time in an enforcement
agency’s history. But irrespective of the denominator (the budget’s
size), the government seeks to maximize DPD.
In the FCPA space, if not in white-collar enforcement generally, the
government has relied on two principal methods to maximize DPD. The
first is the four-part enforcement regime referenced above.4 The
government expects a corporate defendant to pay for its own
investigation, voluntarily disclose the findings, and cooperate with any
further investigation. To incentivize this behavior, the government
offers a reduced sentence (the cooperation credit) which it can guarantee
by promising a negotiated settlement in the form of a deferred or nonprosecution agreement (hence avoiding the costs and unpredictability of
4. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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trial). The defendant company will have financed an investigation—
either internal or independent—and turn over its findings to the
enforcement agency. The government will typically investigate
further—and expect the defendant to cooperate with that
investigation—but the government will rely heavily on the company’s
report.5 This procedure was formalized in the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s adoption of the Organizational Guidelines in 1991, and,
as Professor Reilly chronicles, through a subsequent series of memos
and policy statements by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).6
If cooperation credit means anything at all, it means that the
government has reduced the penalty and, so the critique goes, reduced
the penalty’s deterrent value. But the government has to believe that the
increased deterrence gained from the defendant’s investigation and selfreporting is greater than the lost deterrence of the cooperation credit.
That is, self-disclosure is, or is assumed to be, a deterrence net gain.
Because the government is spared the resource-intensive investigation
and prosecution, self-reporting spreads the government’s limited
resources among many more defendants than would conventional
prosecution.
But there is a second, and perhaps less appreciated, instrument in the
government’s arsenal for increasing deterrence: incentivizing the
adoption of compliance programs. Compliance is variously defined as
an “alignment between the[] organization’s behavior and professed
values”7 or “the processes by which an organization seeks to ensure that
employees and other constituents conform to applicable norms—which
can include either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal
rules of the organization.”8 Compliance as a matter of practice has
erupted in the last two decades or so, leading Sean Griffith to announce
that “American corporations have witnessed the dawn of a new era of
compliance.”9
Compliance might be understood as a kind of preemptive
deterrence.10 Unlike the above-described four-part enforcement regime,

5. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1723.
6. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1692–1700.
7. Matt Kelly, Nicole Sandford, & Thomas Rollauer, 2014 Compliance Trends Survey,
IN FOCUS, 1, 7 (2014), deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/files/2014/06/Compliance
_Week_Compliance_Survey_20141.pdf.
8. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014).
9. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2075, 2077 (2016).
10. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting
Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM:
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which is of course inherently punitive, compliance is preventative. The
government has devised multiple ways for incentivizing companies to
adopt these preventative programs. The first, in 1991, was the adoption
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for
Organizations.11 The Organizational Guidelines included both a penalty
mitigation for the implementation of an effective compliance program
and an increase in criminal penalties generally (thus augmenting the
value of the penalty mitigation).12 Then in 1999 came the DOJ’s famous
Holder Memorandum, which committed prosecutors to considering the
“existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program”13 in
deciding whether to indict corporations. Shortly thereafter, and in the
wake of the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, the DOJ began
relying heavily on deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements, which often require new compliance procedures of the
defendant corporation.14 Details of these programs, when provided in
the settlement documents, become an additional medium for articulating
the government’s views on effective compliance. Finally, the
government will occasionally publish guidance documents such as the
DOJ’s and SEC’s Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.15
We have learned in recent years, however, that the U.S. commitment
to promoting compliance has its limits. Just as Professor Reilly notes, a
groundswell of commentary began to emerge around 2005 that
advocated for the formal statutory adoption of a compliance defense:
Where the defendant can demonstrate that it had in place, at the time of
the violation, an up-to-standard compliance program, and that the
defendant followed that program in good faith, the defendant would not
be liable for the misconduct of employees acting in contravention of
that compliance program.16 This movement was buttressed by the
United Kingdom’s adoption of a limited compliance defense as part of
its Bribery Act of 2010.17 This movement’s principal lobby group
USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 71 (Anthony S. Barkow &
Rachel E. Barkow eds., N.Y.U. Press 2011).
11. Griffith, supra note 9, at 2084 (citing Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 839 (1994)).
12. See id. at 2084–85.
13. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys
(June
16,
1999),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminalfraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF.
14. See Griffith, supra note 9, at 2088.
15. SEC & DOJ, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (Nov.
12, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
16. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1728 n.244.
17. Bribery
Act
2010,
c.
7,
§
2
(UK),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf.
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would become the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which authored a white
paper and began an aggressive lobbying and PR campaign.18 Though
the DOJ resisted the proposal,19 current events of the time would
ultimately wield the sword that felled the Chamber’s movement. In
2012, the New York Times ran an expose that detailed an alleged widespread bribery scheme at Wal-Mart in Mexico.20 The story became a
media feeding frenzy, effectively ending (or at least stalling
indefinitely) any effort to enact a law that could be construed as
weakening the FCPA.
There will be no statutory compliance defense to the FCPA in the
foreseeable future. But the effort to increase incentives to self-report is
alive and well, both among commentators pleading for reforms—not
least of which is Professor Reilly himself—and the government, which
recently demonstrated that it has been paying attention.
II.

PROFESSOR REILLY SPEAKS; THE DOJ LISTENS

Professor Reilly asks two questions. First, what is a company’s
present incentive to self-report? And if that incentive is weak—which
he most assuredly believes—what can the government do to strengthen
it? He concludes what many companies have believed for years,
whether their outside counsel concurred or not: that in many
circumstances it may be in a company’s self-interest to not self-report;
let the government detect a crime the good old-fashioned way. But as a
matter of policy, Professor Reilly finds this state of affairs
unsatisfactory. Accordingly, he urges the government to make the
incentives to self-report stronger, more specific, and more reliable. He,
too, wants the government to maximize its DPD.
Professor Reilly makes the case anew by comparing a number of
big-ticket FCPA settlements, some of which involved self-reporting
while others did not.21 His review of these cases again confirms what
Stephen Choi and Kevin Davis found in one 2011 study,22 and Bruce

18. Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 1, 7, 11–
14 (2011),, www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.
19. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Panel at the 2012 National Lawyers Convention, 51
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 433, 447–48 (2014).
20. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-walmart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
21. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1700-1710.
22. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1709–10 (citing Stephen J. Choi & Kevin Davis, Foreign
Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 20 (Public Law and Legal Theory
Research
Paper
Series,
Working
Paper
No.
12-35,
2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487).
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Hinchey found in another:23 the absence of any basis in the published
FCPA settlements for the claim that penalties are in fact reduced when
defendants voluntarily disclose.24 Professor Reilly therefore makes a
plea for additional and more specific incentives to self-disclose. As it
turns out, the DOJ seems to have heard him.
In the last year, the DOJ has taken a series of dramatic steps to
increase deterrence. In some cases, it has adopted new methods, seeking
to increase the DPD’s numerator. In others it has seen its budget grow
considerably, thus increasing the denominator (with an expectation that
the numerator will likewise increase proportionally).25 But will these
measures address Professor Reilly’s concern, and significantly increase
self-reporting?
The first occurred in September 2015 when the Deputy Attorney
General released a memo, now known as the “Yates Memo,” that
announced a dramatic new focus on individual liability for corporate
wrongdoing.26 With a declared intention to “fully leverage its
resources,”27 or in other words, maximize DPD, the DOJ announced six
changes to policy,28 each of which was incorporated into the U.S.
Attorneys Manual.29 First, a company will not receive cooperation
credit unless it provides to the DOJ “all relevant facts relating to the
individuals responsible for the misconduct.”30 The company must
identify all individuals regardless of their position in the company and
provide all relevant information.31 Second, both criminal and civil
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the start of
the investigation.32 Third, the attorneys handling the civil and criminal
investigations should communicate with each other regularly.33 In the
FCPA context, this would typically mean the DOJ and SEC attorneys.
Fourth, corporate resolutions—meaning deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements—will not provide protection from liability for
23. Id. (citing Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent
FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 399, 415 (2011)).
24. Id. at 1703, 1709.
25. DOJ Asks for $1.1 Billion Increase for Enforcement Components in FY 2017 Budget,
FISHER
BROYLES,
https://www.fisherbroyles.com/doj-asks-for-1-1-billion-increase-forenforcement-components-in-fy-2017-budget/ (last visited July 31, 2016).
26. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen. to the Assistant
Attorney
General,
Antitrust
Div.,
et
al.,
(Sept.
9,
2015),
www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id. at 4.
33. Id.
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individuals within the company.34 Fifth, the corporate resolutions
should not occur without a “clear plan” to resolve individual cases
before the statute of limitations expires.35 Finally, civil lawyers should
decide whether to prosecute individuals based on factors other than an
ability to pay a penalty.36
The Yates Memo attempts to increase DPD’s numerator. That is, the
government apparently believes that these individual prosecutions will
improve deterrence. But scholars are not in agreement on this point. The
movement to hold individuals accountable finds its original scholarly
support in the work of Jennifer Arlen. Her seminal 1994 article, The
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,37 criticized
the view—widely accepted at the time—that imposing strict vicarious
liability on corporations for employee misconduct will invariably
reduce corporate crime.38 She starts from the premise that many forms
of corporate crime—such as securities fraud, government procurement
fraud, or some environmental crimes—are difficult for the government
to detect,39 and that the government therefore needs the corporation to
investigate and sanction internal misconduct.40 However, Arlen shows
that strict vicarious liability will sometimes incentivize corporations to
spend less on internal policing.41 She therefore has advocated
adjustments to corporate criminal liability that will better incentivize the
corporate defendant to investigate and self-report, thus providing to the
government the evidence it needs to prosecute individuals.42 However,
in response to the recent chorus of pleadings for further individual
liability, Sam Buell will argue in a forthcoming book that corporate
liability, while imperfect, may be the best of all available regimes and
the proper focus of enforcement resources.43
But focusing on individual prosecutions has an obvious downside,
which the government recognizes: They are more resource-intensive
than settling with corporations, and by a factor of several. The Yates
Memo thus likely could not have issued without a second important
change. In April of 2016 the DOJ announced an increase in enforcement
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id.
37. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994).
38. Id. at 833–34.
39. Id. at 835.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 836.
42. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997).
43. SAM BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S
CORPORATE AGE (W.W. Norton & Co. forthcoming Aug. 2016).
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resources. Ten prosecutors were added to the Fraud Section’s FCPA
Unit, an increase of “more than 50%. . . .”44 So too did the FBI create
three “new squads of special agents devoted to FCPA investigations and
prosecutions.”45 This increase in resources allows the government to
implement the Yates Memo without diverting resources away from the
self-disclosure regime and thus keep that high-deterrence practice in
tact.
The DOJ has increased its resources in an additional way. In
November 2015, the DOJ Fraud Section hired a full-time compliance
expert, Hui Chen. The DOJ’s expressed purpose in retaining Chen is to
provide “expert guidance” to prosecutors as they evaluate the
compliance programs that were in place at the time the misconduct
occurred.46 She will help the DOJ develop benchmarks for compliance
programs and, to this end, communicate with stakeholders.47 Similarly,
when the resolution of a case includes requiring enhanced compliance
measures, Chen will be involved in evaluating those measures.48
The third recent policy shift was likewise announced in April 2016,
when the DOJ Fraud Section released a memo, styled the Enforcement
Plan and Guidance.49 In addition to the increase in resources described
above, the memo announced the DOJ’s unique Pilot Program. The pilot
program provides specific, quantified penalty reductions in exchange
for various degrees of disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.50
Where the company cooperates and remediates to the DOJ’s
satisfaction, but did not voluntarily disclose, it will receive “at most” a
25% reduction of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range.51 However,
where the company has met all three requirements—voluntary
disclosure, cooperation, and remediation—the DOJ “may provide up to
a 50% reduction” off the bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines fine
range and generally will not require the appointment of a monitor.52
Here, finally, the DOJ tacitly responds to Professor Reilly’s critique
head-on. The Pilot Program is plainly an attempt to make the benefits of

44. Memorandum from Andrew Weissmann, Chief, Fraud Section, The Fraud Section’s
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance 1 (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/838386/download [hereinafter Weissmann Memo].
45. Id.
46. See Press Release, DOJ, New Compliance Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section
(Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Weissmann Memo, supra note 44.
50. Remediation generally means adopting a compliance program, disciplining
employees, and related compliance measures. See id. at 8.
51. Id.
52. Id.

2016]

ON MAXIMIZING DETERRENCE PER DOLLAR

241

self-disclosure more “specific and calculable.”53 But it was not, and is
not, the most visionary of proposals for increasing deterrence.
III.

THE JACOBSON DECLINATION PROPOSAL

Since as far back as April of 2012, an attractive alternative has been
on the table which constitutes a kind of compromise between a statutory
defense and the current Pilot Program. Billy Jacobson, former secondin-command prosecutor at the DOJ’s Fraud Unit and now a partner at
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, first floated his proposal in an April
2012 issue of Bloomberg’s Criminal Law Reporter.54 Jacobson proposes
that rather than a formal statutory amendment, the Fraud Unit exercise
its prosecutorial prosecution and adopt a policy of not bringing FCPArelated criminal charges if the company can demonstrate that it satisfied
five criteria. Those criteria are: 1) voluntary disclosure of the violation,
2) no participation in the illegal conduct by senior management, 3) full
cooperation with the government, including providing evidence and
other information against employees, directors, and agents of the
company, 4) remedial measures to prevent future violations, including
disciplining culpable employees and adopting improved internal
controls and anti-corruption training, and 5) having adopted a strong
compliance program before the illegal conduct occurred.55
Shortly after Jacobson’s article was published, the New York Times
ran its abovementioned expose on Wal-Mart’s alleged bribery in
Mexico.56 Having sounded the death knell for any statutory amendment,
Jacobson’s proposal of a more informal policy became all the more
attractive. Three years later, in November of 2015, the Washington Post
reported that the DOJ Fraud Section was considering a proposal that
sounded quite similar to Jacobson’s.57 But alas, the DOJ elected instead
to try its Pilot Program. Jacobson argued on The FCPA Blog that the
program was a “step forward” but “falls short of accomplishing its
intended goal and certainly is not the bold policy pronouncement for
which many were hoping.”58 He explains that this is true in several
ways. First, it only puts a number on a practice that was already well53. Riley, supra note 1.
54. Billy Jacobson, No Legislation Necessary: A Five-Part Test to Negate Corporate
Criminal Liability in FCPA Cases, 91 BLOOMBERG CRIM. L. REV. 77 (2012).
55. Id.
56. Barstow, supra note 20.
57. Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Could Give Firms a Pass on Foreign Bribery If
They Confess, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/justice-department-weighs-changes-in-how-it-pursues-foreign-briberycases/2015/11/10/95ef0322-87be-11e5-9a07-453018f9a0ec_story.html.
58. Billy Jacobson, Billy Jacobson on the New FCPA Guidance: DOJ Swings and Misses,
THE FCPA BLOG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/4/7/billy-jacobson-on-thenew-fcpa-guidance-doj-swings-and-misse.html.
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established: providing reduced penalties in exchange for disclosure,
cooperation, and remediation. Second, even this informal policy leaves
the DOJ “ample room to avoid according the full benefit:”59 It provides
that the agency “may” provide the reduction and will “consider” a
declination. But ultimately, the fundamental problem with the Pilot
Program is that it “does not go nearly as far as it could have in serving
the goals of law enforcement, while also providing more certainty to
companies.”60 Jacobson’s proposal, by contrast, would both better serve
the interests both of law enforcement and of companies. His five-part
test for granting a declination would “virtually guarantee[]” an increase
in voluntary disclosures, thereby allowing companies to go after both
companies and individuals (thus advancing the goals of the Yates
Memo).61 So too would his proposal provide companies with added
incentives to adopt rigorous compliance programs: It would provide
companies the assurance that they would not be prosecuted if “they did
everything the government wanted them to do” by adopting such
programs.62
Jacobson convincingly makes the case that his proposal would in no
way weaken or dilute the FCPA, but instead advance its purposes by
incentivizing compliance and increasing deterrence. It represents an
alignment of interests between the government and the private sector.
The critical question thus becomes: Is the DOJ still listening?
IV.

CONCLUSION: WHAT WOULD REILLY DO?

When the Pilot Program ends in April 2017, the DOJ will consider
anew the available options for increasing what we are here calling
Deterrence Per Dollar. The FCPA bar, and industry organizations, will
organize to convince the DOJ that it can and should go further to
enhance enforcement. Academics, including the author of this essay,
will likely join the effort. Will Professor Reilly? Given his plea for more
specific and calculable self-reporting incentives, one can only hope.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

